Situations in which agents' choices depend on choices of those in close proximity, be it social or geographic, are ubiquitous. Selecting a new computer platform, signing a political petition, or even catching the u are examples in which social interactions have a signi cant role. While some behaviors or states propagate and explode within the population (e.g., Windows OS, the HIV virus) others do not (e.g., certain computer viruses).
fundamentals (cost distribution, payo s, and network structure) a ect the set of equilibria, and characterize the adoption patterns within the network. Yariv (2005; henceforth GGJVY). Its contribution is in characterizing di usion of strategic behavior and analyzing the stability properties of equilibria, and employing methods that allow us to make comparisons across general network structures and settings. Given that social networks di er substantially and systematically in structure across settings (e.g., ethnic groups, professions, etc.), understanding the implications of social structure on di usion is an important undertaking for a diverse set of applications. Let e P (d)
. This is a standard calculation of the probability of the degree of an agent conditional on that agent being at the end of a randomly chosen link in the network.
Agents each have a choice between taking an action 0 or an action 1. Without loss of generality, we consider the action 0 to be the default behavior (for example, the statusquo technology). Agent i has a cost of choosing 1, denoted c i . Costs are randomly and independently distributed across society, according to a distribution H c ; that we assume to be atomless. We normalize the payo from taking the action 0 to be 0. 1.2. Bayesian Equilibrium. We consider symmetric Bayesian equilibria of the network game: (i) Each agent i knows only her own degree d i and cost c i , the distribution of degrees in the population, and assumes that degrees and cost parameters are independently allocated.
Thus, the game is a Bayesian game in the Harsanyi sense where types are given by degrees and costs. (ii) The play is symmetric in that any agent perceives the distribution of play of each of her neighbors to be independent and to correspond to the distribution of play in the population.
3
Existence of symmetric Bayesian equilibria follows from standard arguments. In cases where v is non-decreasing in x for each d; existence is a direct consequence of Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem, and then there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies. In other cases, provided v is continuous in x for each d; we nd a xed point by appealing to standard xed point theorems (e.g., Kakutani) and admitting mixed strategies.
A simple equation is su cient to characterize equilibria. Let x be the probability that a randomly chosen neighbor chooses the action 1. Then
) is the probability that a random (best responding) neighbor of degree d chooses the action 1. It must be that . Given that equilibria can be described by their corresponding x, we often refer to some value of x as being an \equilibrium."
1.3. A Di usion Process. Consider a di usion process governed by best responses in discrete time. At time t = 0; a fraction x 0 of the population is exogenously and randomly assigned the action 1, and the rest of the population is assigned the action 0. At each time t > 0; each agent, including the agents assigned to action 1 at the outset, best responds to the distribution of agents choosing the action 1 in period t 1, presuming that their neighbors will be a random draw from the population.
denote the fraction of those agents with degree d who have adopted behavior 1 at time t, and let x t denote the link-weighted fraction of agents who have adopted the behavior at time t. That is,
If payo s exhibit complementarities, then convergence of behavior from any starting point is monotone, either upwards or downwards. Once an agent (voluntarily) switches behaviors, the agent will not want to switch back at a later date. Thus, although best responses are myopic, any changes in behavior are equivalently forward-looking. Any rest point of the system corresponds to a static Bayesian equilibrium of the system. If actions are strategic substitutes, convergence may not be guaranteed for all starting points. However, our results will still be useful in characterizing the potential rest points, or equilibria, of such systems.
Equilibrium Structure
2.1. Multiplicity. The multiplicity of equilibria is determined by the properties of , which, in turn, correspond to properties of e P and H. 4 In general, as long as the graph of (x) crosses the 45 degree line only once, there is a unique equilibrium (see Figure 1 below). There is a conceptual connection between our analysis and the recent literature on global games identifying forms of heterogeneity guaranteeing uniqueness when a game with complementarities admits multiple equilibria (see Stephen Morris and Hyun Shin (2003)).
The heterogeneity determining uniqueness in our setup is introduced through the costs agents experience, as well as through the di erent degrees agents have. Our analysis allows us to study the set of stable and unstable equilibria, regardless of multiplicity.
2.2. Stability. Some equilibria are robust to small perturbations, and are therefore stable, while other equilibria are not robust and from them small perturbations lead to signi cant changes in the distribution of play in the population. These are captured in the following de nitions capture.
De nition 1. [Stability and Tipping]. An equilibrium x is stable if there exists " 0 > 0 such that (x ") > x " and (x + ") < x + " for all " 0 > " > 0. An equilibrium
x is unstable or a tipping point if there exists " 0 > 0 such that (x ") < x " and generates greater di usion than another, with corresponding mapping (x); if for any stable equilibrium of the latter there exists a (weakly) higher stable equilibrium of the former, and for any unstable equilibrium of the latter there is either a (weakly) lower unstable equilibrium of the former or else e (0) > 0:
An environment has greater di usion than another if its tipping points are lower, thus making it easier to get di usion started, and its stable equilibria are higher, and so the eventual resting points are higher. Proposition 1. Consider and corresponding through (1) to two regular environments.
If (x) > (x) for each x, then generates greater di usion than .
[ gure 1 here] Proposition 1 implies that a small upward shift in a (continuous) leads to locally lower tipping points and higher stable equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Comparative Statics
Given that (
, and Proposition 1, we can deduce much about changes in the structure of equilibria by considering changes in fundamentals: costs, returns, and network structure that shift (x) in a particular direction for all x. We refer the reader to Jackson and Yariv (2006) for omitted proofs. 
As costs increase, agents are generally less prone to take action 1, and so tipping points are shifting up and stable equilibria are shifting down.
Note in d for all x, then (x) > 0 (x) ( (x) 6 0 (x)) for each x. Thus, if the environments corresponding to P and P 0 are regular, then P generates greater (lesser) di usion than P 0 :
To gain intuition, consider a case in which v(d; x) is non-decreasing in d. Here, any symmetric equilibrium entails higher degree agents choosing action 1 with higher probability.
Start then with any such equilibrium under P 0 and consider a shift to P for which e P FOSD e P 0 : Without any change in strategies, each agent would perceive her neighbors to be more likely to have higher degrees. Thus, a best response would entail a greater propensity to choose the action 1. Iterating best responses converges to an equilibrium involving a (weakly)
higher rate of agents of each type choosing the action 1: It is easier to get the action 1 adopted and tipping points are lower.
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As for welfare, suppose v(d; x) is non-decreasing in x: A FOSD change in the degree distribution generates higher expected payo s corresponding to stable equilibria for agents 5 A related result appears in GGJVY (Propositions 4 and 5), but with several di erences. That result does not distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria and only applies to a special class of payo functions, but that result applies to more general action spaces (in the case where H is non-decreasing).
of any given type. If the underlying degree distribution itself is shifted in the sense of FOSD (i.e., P FOSD P 0 ), then more weight is shifted to higher expected payo agents and overall welfare increases. This condition is naturally satis ed when, e.g., P is a simple translation of the distribution P 0 . Unfortunately, more general forms of FOSD shifts in the distribution of neighbors' degrees do not always correspond to FOSD shifts in the original degree distribution and so welfare implications are, in general, ambiguous.
6
We now consider changes in the heterogeneity of connectedness through mean-preserving spreads of the degree distribution.
is non-decreasing and convex (non-increasing and
for all x, and so P generates greater (lesser) di usion than
in d and non-decreasing in x, then if x is a stable equilibrium under P and
is a stable equilibrium under P 0 ; the expected welfare under P when x is played, is higher (lower) than under P 0 when x is played.
The greater di usion result follows from the de nition of MPS and (x). Regarding welfare, let x ; x be given as stable points satisfying the Proposition's statement. The welfare level under P when x is played is
v is non-decreasing, and this in turn is greater than or equal to
P is a MPS of P 0 . The claim then follows.
Note that this result implies that if H(d; x) is non-decreasing and convex, then power, Poisson, and regular degree distributions with identical means generate corresponding values of power ; P oisson ; and regular such that
This is consistent with the simulation-based observations regarding tipping points in the epidemiology literature (see Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2000)).
Proposition 4 is useful in identifying the structure of optimal networks. Indeed, suppose we ask which P with a given average d and support in 1; : : : ; D maximizes (
. If we have a P which maximizes this pointwise, then we know that it leads to greater di usion than any other P . It follows directly that:
is non-decreasing and convex in d, then the P which maximizes di usion (under our greater di usion partial ordering) is one which has weight only on degree 1 and D (in proportions to yield average degree d). If H(d; x) is non-increasing and concave in d, then the P which maximizes di usion (under our greater di usion partial ordering) is a regular network with full weight on degree d.
Changes in Returns to
Adoption. We now contemplate changes in the returns to the action 1 and their e ects on the eventual adoption rate. This is interesting for a wide range of applications, e.g., directed advertising in marketing, optimal immunization processes in epidemiology, etc. We concentrate on the special case in which
Consider starting with a given e v(d) and then reordering it to become e v 0 (d). 7 Let us say that a reordering e v 0 of e v is weight increasing if the following condition holds: For any d and
The condition states that any values of e v that have been reordered should be reordered so that higher values are assigned to degrees that have higher conditional weight. The implications of the Proposition are that in order to lower the set of tipping points and increase the set of stable equilibria, the appropriate choice of e v(d) requires matching the ordering of e v(d) with that of P (d)d. 8 The simple intuition is that in order to maximize di usion, one wants the the types that are most prone to adopt a behavior to be those who are most prevalent in the society in terms of being most likely to be neighbors.
Interestingly, this leads to conclusions that are counter much of the common wisdom in the literature. Indeed, if one can only target a speci c number of nodes, then one would like to target those with the highest degree as they will have the greatest number of neighbors. 7 Formally, e v and e v 0 are reorderings of one another if there is a permutation of 1; 2; : : : such that e v( (d)) = e v 0 (d) for each d. 8 Jackson and Yariv (2006) contains the proof, and a result for uniform H c , where in order to increase pointwise, we do not need the reordering to be weight increasing, but rather just to increase weight on average. This is the standard \hub" idea. Note, however, that the exercise here is di erent. We ask which types are most in uential, when accounting for the population size and thus their likelihood to be neighbors. 
Convergence Patterns and S-Shaped Rates of Adoption
We close with an analysis of convergence patterns. We can get an idea of the \speed of convergence" of the system at di erent points by examining the di erence x that (x) x is increasing (decreasing) up to x and then decreasing (increasing) past x (whenever (x) = 2 f0; 1g).
Proof of Proposition 7:
. Let x be such that Proposition 7 helps characterize the di usion paths. Consider a strictly concave H:
There are three possible equilibria con gurations: 0 is a unique and stable equilibrium, 0
is an unstable equilibrium and there is a unique stable equilibrium above 0, or 0 is not an equilibrium and there is a unique stable equilibrium above 0. In the rst case, 0 (0) 6 1 necessarily and the dynamic process would converge to 0 regardless of the starting point. In the other cases, if 0 (0) > 1, then x lies above 0 and Proposition 7 implies that the adoption over time will exhibit an S-shape. From small initial levels of x the change in x will gain speed up to the level of x , and will then start to slow down until eventually coming to rest at the adjacent stable equilibrium.
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We can also say something about adoption patterns by degrees. The dynamic process corresponding to each degree d is given by x The distinction between di erent adoption paths corresponding to di erent degree players is important from an econometric point of view. Indeed, it provides additional restrictions on fundamentals arising from cross-sectioning data according to social degree. [ gure 2 here] 9 S shaped adoption curves are prevalent in case studies of di usion. Frank Bass (1969) and follow-ups provided (network-free) contagion models explaining this general shape, and Peyton Young (2006) provides a learning model generating S shaped adoption curves.
